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THE FAMILY AND THE MARKET AT WAL-MART1
Naomi Schoenbaum*

INTRODUCTION
One of the core tenets of Wal-Mart culture is that of family. Not
only has the company sought to cultivate an identity based on “family,
community and the supposedly traditional values of a bygone era,”
but it has also marketed itself as becoming a stand-in family for its
employees.2 Wal-Mart’s reliance on the family metaphor straddles the
divide between the family and the market that feminist scholars have
long debunked as false and harmful to women.3
But the company’s focus on the Wal-Mart family obscures the omission of another relevant family for the Wal-Mart worker: the legal
family. And it is the legal family that underlies an often overlooked
piece of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes sex discrimination class
action: the challenge to the relocation policy.4 The policy required
anyone interested in a managerial position be “willing to relocate . . .
1. I owe the title to Frances Olsen’s seminal work, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. For helpful conversations and comments, I thank Michael Abramowicz, Kelli Alces, Naomi Cahn, Laura Dickinson, Stephen Galoob, Michael Selmi, Peter Smith, and Lesley Wexler.
2. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW WAL-MART CREATED A BRAVE
NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS 70, 90–96 (2009). Wal-Mart’s posting of the following quotes (among
other similar ones) on its website evidence this effort: a financial analyst in the home office
whose husband was deployed in Iraq stating that “ ‘Wal-Mart truly has become my second family,’ ” id. at 72; an employee in the legal department stating that she found the “ ‘Wal-Mart family
culture’ ” in the Florida distribution center and in the home office, id. at 68; a loss prevention
associate in Georgia who, in response to attacks on Wal-Mart in the media, states, “ ‘I am confident that we, as a family, will overcome the obstacles that stand in our way. . . . I stand by my
Wal-Mart,’” id. at 68.
3. See generally Olsen, supra note 1 (arguing that life and law both construct and presuppose
this family–market divide, which creates a hierarchy with family and women at the bottom). I
will explore the crossover of family and work metaphors and the relevance for legal boundaries
in later work.
4. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (noting “a willingness to
relocate” as a condition of promotion); id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing plaintiffs’ challenge to the relocation policy). As I have written in earlier
work, the two primary social and legal motivations for long-distance moves are employment and
family. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1171, 1176–93.
Wal-Mart’s family metaphor renders a long-distance move for the company overdetermined, as
it can then be motivated by both employment and family(-like) reasons.
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whenever and wherever [Wal-Mart] needed them.”5 This relocation
policy may hurt employees’ families by forcing employees to choose
between uprooting their families, or giving up the benefits of promotion altogether. The plaintiffs alleged that the relocation policy contributed to women’s considerable underrepresentation in the
company’s management ranks.6 They challenged the policy on the basis of both a disparate treatment theory—that managers did not consider women for promotions on the assumption that they would not
move because of their priority of family over work—and a disparate
impact theory—that women in fact were less likely to move due to
their family priorities and thus were disproportionately excluded from
management positions.
These disparate treatment and disparate impact challenges
amounted to twin flaws in the company’s application of the policy as it
intersected with an employee’s legal family: Wal-Mart considered the
employee’s family both too much by applying sex stereotypes about
women’s family priorities, and too little by failing to appreciate the
impact of the policy on women due to their family role. As the Dukes
case shows, however, Title VII fails to remedy this overreliance and
underreliance on the family as a barrier to women’s employment opportunities and, in fact, merely replicates it. Employment discrimination law simultaneously pays too little and too much attention to the
family in addressing sex inequality that arises at the intersection of the
family and the market. The law both ignores the systematic sex-based
5. Declaration of William T. Bielby, Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 28, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No. C-01-2252 MJJ) [hereinafter Bielby Decl.] (internal quotation marks omitted). While there was some disagreement about
whether the policy formally remained in place, the reality for those who wanted to advance in
the company was long-distance relocation: over 60% of store managers, assistant managers, and
management trainees change regions at least once, and many relocate multiple times as they
move up the corporate ladder. See Declaration of Richard Drogin Ph.D in Support of Plaintiffs’
Motion for Class Certification at 45, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (No.
C-01-2252 MJJ) [hereinafter Drogin Decl.]; Bielby Decl., supra, at 27–28 (noting “[l]ess consistent . . . testimony about whether an employee must be able and willing to relocate their place of
residence in order to be considered for a management position,” but giving multiple examples of
upper level management requiring employees to “ ‘certify in writing’ ” their willingness to move
and reporting that “hourly employees usually move to a different store when they become management trainees and are promoted to Assistant Store Manager positions, and promotion to CoManager and Store Manager almost always involves relocation as well”); LICHSTENSTEIN, supra
note 2, at 137 (“Assistant Managers who want to advance are constantly on the move, taking
new posts far away from family and friends.”). The policy’s focus on employees’ broadest possible availability—a willingness to relocate anywhere—before a specific need of the employer
arises suggests that the relocation policy is standing in as a proxy for commitment to Wal-Mart,
as well as the priority of the Wal-Mart family over the legal family.
6. Although 65% of hourly employees were women, only 33% of managerial positions were
filled by women. Drogin Decl., supra note 5, at 9–10.
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harm to the employee’s family that arises from the intersection of an
employer policy with gendered family structures and risks presupposing these family phenomena in a way that reinforces the very stereotypes that the law is meant to eradicate. By simultaneously ignoring
the family and assuming its contradiction with the market, Title VII
continues to uphold and reinforce the theoretical divide between family priorities and the demands of the market.
Title VII’s insufficient recognition of the family can be seen through
the class of plaintiffs who challenged the relocation policy: Wal-Mart’s
women employees who failed to advance pursuant to the policy. Denying any individual woman employee a promotion under the relocation policy on the basis of gender stereotypes about family roles would
constitute unlawful disparate treatment.7 As plaintiffs’ sociologist explained, “The company’s practice of requiring relocation across stores
in order to move into salaried management positions makes the promotion process especially vulnerable to gender stereotyping.”8 But
another group of women are also harmed by Wal-Mart’s relocation
policy: the wives (and partners) of male employees who do move pursuant to the policy. Gendered family dynamics mean that husbands
are more likely to drive long-distance employment moves, and wives
are more likely to trail, which has substantial negative effects on
women’s employment outcomes and earnings.9 Because employment
discrimination law provides remedies only to prospective or current
employees, the law is too limited in its recognition of the family to
address sex inequality that results from the intersection of the relocation policy and gender dynamics within the family. So although the
relocation policy premises an employee’s advancement on uprooting
7. Even if women as a class are less willing to relocate, an employer is not entitled to evaluate
any individual woman employee on that basis. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–11 (1978) (striking down a policy requiring women to make larger
pension contributions based on actuarial data that women live longer because it was sex discrimination to treat any individual woman according to the characteristics of the class); Lust v. Sealy,
Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding a ruling for a female plaintiff who was denied a
promotion that required her to move because her supervisor did not think she wanted to relocate her family).
8. Bielby Decl., supra note 5, at 27. These stereotypes are especially strong for mothers. See
Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J.
SOC. ISSUES 701, 711 (2004) (finding that mothers are “viewed as less competent and less worthy
of training than their childless female counterparts” and “less competent than they were before
they had children,” and that adding a child lowered interest in training, hiring, and promoting a
woman); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic, 60 J.
SOC. ISSUES 683, 690 (2004) (noting that while mothers are expected to always to be “on call for
their children,” a worker is expected to be “unencumbered by competing demands and be always there for his or her employer”).
9. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1215–16.
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the employee in a way that systematically harms women’s employment opportunities, Title VII provides no relief for these women.
This forces any relief for these women into other areas of law, leading
to both inadequate remedies and inadequate recognition of structural
barriers to women’s employment opportunities.
The only way to seek recognition of the family through Title VII is
through a disparate impact challenge. On this theory, the Dukes
plaintiffs claimed that the relocation policy disproportionately took
women out of consideration for management positions because
women were less willing to move for promotions than men, again due
to family roles.10 If such a policy that disproportionately burdens
women is not a job-related business necessity, or if a less discriminatory alternative exists, the policy is an unlawful barrier.11 But proceeding on this theory risks overreliance on the family. Plaintiffs must
submit statistics to prove the relocation policy’s adverse impact on
women. In cases in which the adverse impact arises from gendered
family structures rather than an immutable physical trait, the claim
itself and the proof on which it relies can be read as evidence that
women in fact are more committed to family than to work. For example, in the Dukes case, evidence that women are excluded from management positions due to the relocation requirement runs the risk of
supporting the already held view that women are in fact less willing to
move for work due to family constraints. So while Title VII aims to
10. Even Sam Walton conceded this. See SAM WALTON WITH JOHN HUEY, MADE IN
AMERICA: MY STORY 170–71 (1992) (“[The relocation policy] really put good, smart women at
a disadvantage in our company because at that time they weren’t as free to pick up and move as
many men were.”).
11. Wal-Mart would likely defend such a policy as a way to maximize flexibility and to avoid
workplace strife created when an employee ascends to manage his former coworkers. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1005–06 (1988) (explaining that the employer can
defend against a disparate impact by showing the practice is a job-related, business necessity, but
the employees can still prevail by showing that “other selection processes that have a lesser
discriminatory effect could also suitably serve the employer’s business needs”). These concerns
stem from the primary attachment Wal-Mart seeks to develop in its managers: to corporate WalMart rather than to a particular store or to the manager’s coworkers. See Nelson Lichtenstein,
Op-Ed., Wal-Mart’s Authoritarian Culture, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, at A21. Courts are split
on whether these workplace dynamics justifications constitute business necessity. See Timothy
D. Chandler et al., Spouses Need Not Apply: The Legality of Antinepotism and No-Spouse Rules,
39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 47–50 (2002) (discussing a split regarding morale justifications in
disparate impact challenges to antinepotism policies). But even Sam Walton explained why the
policy was bad for business: “[A]s the company grows bigger, we need to find more ways to stay
in touch with the communities where we operate, and one of the best ways to do that is by hiring
locally, developing managers locally, and letting them have a career in their home community—
if they perform.” WALTON, supra note 10, at 170–71. And there may be suitable alternatives
that would achieve the policy’s goal. See id. (noting that the relocation policy may have been
“more rigid than it needed to be”).
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reduce family-based stereotypes that impede women’s employment
opportunities through its disparate treatment branch, it may entrench
these very same stereotypes through its disparate impact branch, leading to a tension between these two branches of Title VII, particularly
in the context of sex discrimination.
Following the Introduction, this Article proceeds in three Parts.
Part II addresses Title VII’s shortcomings related to too little recognition of the family. Part III addresses Title VII’s opposite dangers related to too much recognition of the family. Finally, Part IV
introduces the possibility of Title VII addressing the family–market
divide through a more considered recognition of the family that acknowledges the family’s role in limiting employment opportunities
without entrenching harmful sex stereotypes.
II. THE LIMITS

OF

TITLE VII: TOO LITTLE FAMILY

Women are often disadvantaged in the market by the intersection of
gendered family structures that disproportionately impose family responsibilities on women and workplace policies constructed around
market norms of complete commitment to work.12 Scholars have observed how this makes it difficult for women to succeed in the workplace to the extent these market norms are directly imposed on them
as employees.13 Title VII limits this barrier to advancement by
prohibiting employers from stereotyping women applicants and employees based on family responsibilities and by prohibiting specific
employer policies with an unjustified disparate impact on women due
to family responsibilities.14 Employer policies constructed around
market norms can also have a systematic impact on women’s employment opportunities, not only as employees subject to these policies,
but also as the wives or partners of employees subject to such policies.
To the extent such policies expect “ideal worker”15 performance from
men in the market, this can lead their women partners to take on stereotypically feminine roles in the family, causing these women harm in
their market roles and contributing to systematic gender inequality in
the market.
12. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1–6 (2000).
13. Id.
14. See Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. § 615 (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/caregiving.pdf; Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313, 1344 (2008).
15. See WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1.
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This Part uses the challenge to Wal-Mart’s relocation policy to illustrate how Title VII selectively takes account of only the direct harms
of sex discrimination on employees. By failing to account for the
harms that discriminatory employer policies indirectly impose on the
family, Title VII takes too little account of the family. Long-distance
moves, including those made pursuant to Wal-Mart’s relocation policy, cause women to suffer in employment outcomes not only as employees who are denied promotion opportunities, but also as the wives
and partners of Wal-Mart employees who move for their jobs. But
employment discrimination law does not recognize these harms to the
family, and other areas of law do so in only a limited—and potentially
harmful—way. By selectively recognizing only the direct market
harms of sex discrimination and ignoring harms to the family that
originate in the market, Title VII reinforces the family–market divide
even as it provides some relief for sex discrimination.
A. Gendered Family Dynamics and Title VII
In light of the existence of the legal family and the gendered dynamics therein, Wal-Mart’s relocation policy has implications for sex
equality that extend beyond its employees and into the family. Because a family typically picks one location for both husband and wife,
geographic mobility makes salient the linked employment trajectories
of husbands and wives.16 If the family agrees that one spouse will
relocate for employment, the other typically follows, often disrupting
16. In the context of geographic mobility, this link is often clearest with married couples because the law mostly facilitates and rewards co-location of the family when one spouse relocates
for employment purposes. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1187–93 (describing ways in which
family law, unemployment insurance, and tax benefits foster co-location of married couples).
Unmarried partners, both same sex and opposite sex, may of course move together for one
partner’s employment prospects, even if the law does not support such moves with the same
incentives. And at least for unmarried couples who seek the legal benefits of domestic partnership, the law may do more than facilitate and reward co-location; in many jurisdictions, colocation may be a legal requirement as an indicia of the relationship’s authenticity. See Mary
Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1774 (2005) (discussing how domestic
partnership laws often require cohabitation of partners). This Article will generally refer to
affected wives and nonmarital partners of relocated employees as a group as “partners,” recognizing that the extent to which the law operates on the partner’s co-location, if at all, varies by
the nature of the legal relationship.
Same-sex couples of course do not display consistent sex-based inequality in their moves.
Their moves may show more egalitarian patterns, or they may nonetheless be “gendered,” in
that one partner takes the more stereotypically masculine “driving” role and the other partner
takes the more stereotypically feminine “trailing” role. Cf. Deborah Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 783–88 (2012) (citing studies showing that same-sex
couples may divide market and household labor more equally, but positing that same-sex marriage may change this as the law of marriage encourages specialization).
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the latter’s employment.17 These relocation decisions are not sex
equal. Husbands’ jobs are more likely to determine residential location of the family unit.18 Married women are less likely to relocate for
work than their husbands.19 This makes women more likely to be
“tied stayers.”20 On the flip side, wives are more likely to leave a job
to accommodate a partner’s job change.21 This makes women more
likely to be “tied movers.”22
By requiring relocation as a condition of advancement, a relocation
policy like Wal-Mart’s contributes to negative economic consequences
for tied movers—the mostly female partners of the mostly male employees who move pursuant to the policy.23 Gendered mobility dynamics mean that a family relocation has significant effects on the
economic lives of men and women, enhancing men’s careers and incomes, while diminishing women’s prospects and earnings.24 When
couples move, the income gap between husbands and wives increases
significantly, on average to the tune of nearly $3,000.25 And the income gap can grow over time with repeated moves, as the first mover
reaps employment-related rewards from the first move and then is
more likely to drive the next move.26 By contributing to occupational
segregation and to differential opportunities in the labor market for
men and women more generally, gendered tied-mover dynamics may
also help explain the ongoing gender gap in employment outcomes
even outside of marriage.27
17. This sentence glosses over bargaining over the relocation decision. See, e.g., Robert Pollak, Comment on Mary Anne Case’s Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 261, 267–68 (2011) (positing a two-stage bargaining game in marriage in which
wage rates affect a spouses’ bargaining power and explaining how the inability of a spouse to
make a credible commitment not to exploit additional bargaining power conferred by a move
that enhances that spouse’s wage rate may lead moves not to occur); William T. Bielby & Denise
D. Bielby, I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-Role Beliefs, and Reluctance to Relocate for a
Better Job, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1241, 1245, 1261 (1992) (explaining how gender-role ideology introduces asymmetry into the process by which husbands and wives decide how to respond to a
job opportunity in a different location such that the wife’s net economic gain (or loss) from a
prospective geographic move is likely to be discounted relative to that of the husband).
18. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1216.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1215.
22. Id. at 1215–16.
23. Indeed, historically, Wal-Mart’s managers were all “family men.” See LICHTENSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 56.
24. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1216.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1217.
27. Lower paying, pink-collar jobs overpopulated by women are geographically ubiquitous,
making it easier for women to fill the trailing role. Id. at 1218. Employment exit or threat of exit

766

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:759

Relocation policies like Wal-Mart’s also reinforce stereotypes of
men’s role in the labor market and the family. The flip side of the
stereotype of women valuing family over work is the stereotype of
men valuing work over family. A Seventh Circuit opinion, in a sex
discrimination promotion denial case based on the employer’s stereotypical view of women and relocation, provides a vivid example of
just this reverse stereotype. Even in upholding the employee’s claim,
Judge Posner noted that “[r]ealism requires acknowledgment that the
average mother is more sensitive than the average father to the possibly disruptive effect on children of moving to another city.”28 Just as
employers may assume that a woman would not relocate for a promotion, an employer may likewise expect that a man will relocate, making it harder for him to object to these terms for a promotion or to
turn down opportunities that hinge on relocating. It is precisely the
stereotype of the male ideal worker who is unfazed by relocation that
contributes to relocation policies and broader pro-mobility laws and
norms.29 To the extent that work-related relocations are viewed as
relatively low cost for men, the costs of relocation tend not to be seen
at all—either by employers, or by the law. This is so despite the significant costs imposed by mobility for sex equality.30
But as the Dukes case illustrates, only female employees who were
denied a promotion under the relocation policy—the tied stayers—
can sue for relief under either the disparate treatment or disparate
impact theories of Title VII.31 Tied movers—disproportionately
women—who give up employment opportunities and income by relocating with a Wal-Mart employee find no relief under Title VII. There
is a straightforward doctrinal reason for this: Title VII only provides
remedies for harms experienced by the employees of a discriminating
employer and not for the harms imposed on third parties, including
family members.32 Statutory language33 and standing requirements34
is more likely to aid men’s careers because it signals upward mobility, whereas for women it will
signal family trailing. Id. at 1217–18.
28. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
29. See WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 1–6 (describing the concept of the ideal worker as infinitely available and flexible, without responsibilities to others).
30. Mobility also imposes other costs for relationships that support individuals and families at
home and at work, including extended family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers, as well as costs
for employers and the community in the form of lost social capital. See Schoenbaum, supra note
4, at 1193–1209 (exploring the costs of mobility and how the law fails to recognize them).
31. A successful disparate impact suit could lead to elimination of the relocation policy, which
could essentially prevent harm that would otherwise befall future tied movers. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part II.C.
32. Title VII recognizes relational aspects of discrimination in limited ways, but none would
provide a cause of action for a non-employee family member. The following offers a few examples. The closest Title VII has come to recognizing sex discriminatory harms to the family
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present obstacles to allowing anyone beyond an employee to sue an
employer for discrimination. And an employee who moved pursuant
to the policy could not bring a claim on behalf of a disaffected spouse
because the employee would have faced no adverse employment
action.35
In light of the family–market divide, it may not be surprising that
employment discrimination law only addresses the category of harms
to tied stayers, who are employees, and not to tied movers, who are
family. Nonetheless, scholars have begun to criticize employment discrimination law’s failure to take account of the harms that discrimination visits on members of an employee’s family. Professor Zachary
Kramer, for example, has noted how employment discrimination can
create additional stress on the employee by limiting or straining family
relationships.36 But the law currently recognizes these harms only as
harms to the employee and not as harms to the family members themselves.37 This Article joins the nascent literature urging further consideration of the harms that discriminatory employer policies visit on
the family, particularly systematic harms that arise due to the linked
employment trajectories of husbands and wives.
through the effect of an employer’s policy on male employees was the recognition of sex discrimination when a benefits package was less generous to the wives of male employees than to husbands of female employees, but these harms were framed in terms of the value of the benefits
package to the employees themselves. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1983). A plaintiff employee may recover damages when discrimination limits or strains her relationship with her partner or child. See Zachary A. Kramer, After
Work, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 629 (2007) (citing Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Americans with Disabilities Act allows an
employee to bring a claim for discrimination based on her family or other relationship with a
disabled person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(4) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination as a result
of “the known disability of an individual with whom [the employee] is known to have a relationship or association”). An employee can bring a claim for race discrimination when an employer
discriminates against an employee because of the employee’s race in relation to the race of a
romantic partner (i.e., an interracial relationship). See Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from
Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 211 (2012). And a recent ruling by the
Supreme Court held that an employee could raise a claim for retaliation based on her employer’s
termination of her fiancé. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868, 870 (2011).
33. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individiual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
34. A non-employee family member would unlikely be seen as within “the zone of interests”
of the statute. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
35. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“A tangible employment
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”).
36. See Kramer, supra note 32, at 655–58.
37. See id. at 664–66 (arguing that employment discrimination law should independently recognize harms to the family as additional, separate costs of discrimination).
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In the context of Dukes, taking the plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination as true—that fewer women advanced because the relocation
policy amounted to either disparate treatment or disparate impact—
the result of Wal-Mart’s discrimination was that a disproportionate
number of men relocated under the policy, along with their tiedmover partners. This means that a systematic consequence of WalMart’s relocation policy was harm to the employment prospects of its
relocated employees’ partners—disproportionately women. While
these women are not Wal-Mart employees, they faced adverse employment consequences as a result of the sex-discriminatory decisions
of an employer, and these adverse employment consequences are systematically and disproportionately suffered by women. But neither
the male employees who move pursuant to the policy nor their partners are harmed in any way that Title VII recognizes.
While Title VII’s current statutory limits undoubtedly bar these
suits, it is nonetheless worth probing some of the theoretical objections to recognizing this type of harm to the family under Title VII.
One might object that given the lack of employment relationship, it is
not at all obvious that an employer should have any legal obligation to
non-employees. But this may be an overly formal view of that relationship. Sociology of the workplace has long explored the ways in
which family members, and wives in particular, support the work of
the employee and the employer. In the seminal work on the subject,
Men and Women of the Corporation, Rosabeth Moss Kanter details
how wives of employees support the corporation by, for example, entertaining clients, maintaining files, transcribing notes, and beyond,
and are thus an integral part of the corporate structure, regardless of
their formal employment status.38 Tied movers for example often provide support to the relocating spouse and the family that is invaluable
in helping the relocating spouse succeed in the new location, with benefits accruing to the employer.39 From a functional perspective of the
employment relationship, the boundary between the employee and
the family is somewhat porous.
One might further object that the employer’s discriminatory policy
imposes a harm on the family by conferring a benefit on the employee
that the employee chose to accept; the household would not have
38. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 110 (2d ed. 1993);
see also Marcia L. Bellas, The Effects of Marital Status and Wives’ Employment on the Salaries of
Faculty Men: The (House)Wife Bonus, 6 GENDER & SOC’Y 609, 610 (1992) (noting the concept
of the “two-person career” and discussing ways in which employed and unemployed wives contribute directly to husbands’ careers).
39. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1214–15.
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made this choice if it did not make the household better off. It is
worth disaggregating the claim about choice and the claim about overall welfare effects. As for choice, we cannot trust the decisions of
households to reflect the aggregated preferences of their members. In
particular, women are more likely than men to sacrifice their own
preferences for other goals, such as accounting for other family members’ preferences.40 And there are reasons to believe that employees
and their families may not adequately account for the costs of longdistance moves.41 Therefore, despite the fact that the move was chosen, this choice might not be a product of an accurate calculus of its
impact on the household and, in particular, women tied movers.
As for the overall welfare claim, the household may be made better
off by the move if the total income of the household increases (or the
move brings other benefits, such as a lower cost of living, better
weather, or proximity to extended family), despite the tied mover’s
employment losses. But even in cases in which this holds, it should
not assuage concerns from a gender equality perspective because of
the role of women’s market work in contributing to self-esteem and
economic independence,42 as well as the importance of gender equality in the labor market as an end in itself. So although the statutory
standing and adverse employment action limits on Title VII take such
concerns outside the statute’s scope, the systematic harm to women’s
employment opportunities resulting from relocation and other policies
that presume fully flexible family arrangements militate in favor of
thinking about ways to bring these harms within the statute’s reach, a
subject taken up in Part III.
B. Extra-Title VII Remedies
The previous Part showed how Title VII fails to provide a remedy
for harms visited on the partners of employees due to the intersection
of employer policies and gendered family dynamics. In light of the
current boundaries of antidiscrimination law at the intersection of the
family and the market, the legal remedy for the negative employment
effects on employees’ (disproportionately women) partners is left to
other devices, all of which are imperfect. They provide limited remedies and risk incentivizing the very gendered dynamics they seek to
40. Amartya K. Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES 123,
125–26 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (discussing how the influence of family identity makes it difficult
for some women to formulate notions of individual welfare separate from the family’s welfare).
41. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1210–13 (recounting cognitive biases and other features
of decision making that would lead movers to underestimate the costs of relocation).
42. Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1891–92 (2000).
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ameliorate. They also lack the expressive function of antidiscrimination law: a moral judgment of the harm caused by systematic barriers
to equal employment opportunity.
Policymakers have attempted to address the impact of gendered
family dynamics on employment for partners through unemployment
insurance (UI) benefits. The federal stimulus package included incentive funds for state UI programs to provide benefits when workers
quit for “compelling family reasons.”43 Under this “compelling family
reason” provision, a number of states now grant UI benefits to tied
movers who quit their jobs to move with a spouse who relocates for
employment purposes.44
UI benefits provide compensation to afford affected partners more
time to search for a better job (in the case of tied movers, in the new
location).45 But UI benefits for affected partners such as tied movers
do not compensate for all of the losses that accompany their loss of
employment. They provide only partial wage replacement and do not
compensate for the gap of employment on a resume or lost investments with a particular employer. Also, for many employees, work
provides a critical sense of identity and meaning.46 So even if UI benefits did provide full monetary compensation for employment losses,
psychic losses associated with unemployment and lesser attachment to
the workforce are not compensated and may not be compensable.47
And they often provide no relief to unmarried partners or for employment losses that stop short of unemployment.48
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1103(f)(3)(B) (Supp. II 2010).
44. Id. § (B)(iii); see also Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1170, 1186.
45. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV.
335, 342–43 (2001).
46. See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 14, 118 (2003); Schultz, supra note 42, at 1892, 1909–10.
47. Although these limits are always true of UI, they are more concerning when UI is used as
a substitute for antidiscrimination remedies.
48. The federal law that provides additional funding to states who “modernize” their UI
schemes, including by providing benefits to relocating spouses, defines the benefit in terms of
married spouses. 42 U.S.C. § 1103(f)(3)(B)(iii). Some states have awarded benefits to unmarried partners under appropriate circumstances. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986)
(including registered domestic partners); Macgregor v. Unemp’t Ins. Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453,
454 (Cal. 1984) (granting benefits when the unmarried couple were engaged and had a child so
they could maintain the established family unit); Reep v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Emp’t &
Training, 593 N.E.2d 1297, 1301 (Mass. 1992) (granting benefits to an unmarried woman who
quit her job to be with her partner of thirteen years). But see Norman v. Unemp’t Ins. Appeals
Bd., 663 P.2d 904, 906 (Cal. 1983) (denying benefits to a woman who quit her job to follow
cohabiting fiancé because “[s]he did not . . . represent that her marriage was imminent, that her
presence . . . was required to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any definite or
fixed marital plans”).
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Moreover, UI benefits provide compensation to affected partners—
again, disproportionately women—for taking on stereotypical gender
roles in the family and the market. The UI benefits are, in effect,
subsidizing, and perhaps incentivizing, this role-consistent behavior
without fully accounting for the losses it entails to the partners themselves and to the broader goal of gender equality in the market. In the
case of Wal-Mart’s relocation policy, for example, the policy imposes
costs for tied movers, which the law then partially compensates. Due
to this compensation, the benefits that relocation confers on the employee now do not need to be so great to offset the losses to the tied
mover to justify relocation. In this way, UI benefits subsidize WalMart’s relocation policy, despite its effect on women’s employment
equality, which may not only generate more moves, but may also create fewer incentives for Wal-Mart to internalize the costs of its policy.49 This supports the critique of Wal-Mart’s overreliance on
government subsidies to support its employees.50
Family law provides only an incomplete remedy for the effects of
gendered family dynamics on participation in market work through
the division of assets at the time of divorce. Taking the mobility example, family law takes some account of the unequal distribution
within the family of the employment benefits of mobility through
property division and alimony awards to tied movers. But even to the
extent that property is divided equally between a tied mover and her
husband, most families have very little property. The law generally
does not account for differences in future income streams, typically
the largest asset remaining after a divorce.51 This means that, for example, a husband who moved pursuant to Wal-Mart’s relocation policy will be entitled to continue owning his salary after divorce—a
salary that likely benefited from the relocation. His tied mover wife
will likewise own her salary after divorce—a salary that likely was diminished by the relocation.
49. See Schoenbaum, supra note 4, at 1217 (“If gender drives relocation decisions despite
efficiency, as research suggests, there is less reason to be concerned about these incentive effects,
as husbands’ careers may dictate family relocation decisions regardless of UI benefits.”). If the
trailing spouse is compensated for some employment losses, this may make men more willing to
take on this role, which would help to reform the underlying gendered mobility dynamics.
50. See generally LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 216 (documenting how the company pays
sufficiently low wages to keep employees eligible for public health care benefits); Alice Hines,
Walmart’s New Health Care Policy Shifts Burden to Medicaid, Obamacare, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/01/walmart-health-care-policy-medicaidobamacare_n_2220152.html (explaining how a recent change in the company’s health care policy
will lead to more employees being covered by Medicaid and Obamacare).
51. See Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
2227, 2251–52 (1994).
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Of course, to the extent family law does provide some remedy for
the unequal distribution of gendered family dynamics, it does so only
at the dissolution of a marriage, and only for couples who were legally
married.52 Moreover, even if divorce law fully compensated tied movers for their lost income, it is not clear whether this would be a desirable result from the perspective of gender equality in the market.
Insuring women against these employment losses upon divorce essentially creates a moral hazard for women to incur such losses. So despite financial compensation, women still would not get the nonmonetary benefits of market work,53 nor would progress be made toward women’s employment equality.54
Whether unemployment insurance or family law provides some relief to affected partners like tied movers, locating the legal system’s
response to harms systematically visited disproportionately on women
outside of antidiscrimination law obscures broader issues of gender
equality in the market. Sam Walton’s view of Wal-Mart’s relocation
policy reveals how these broader equality issues are hard to see. Although even Walton came to recognize that Wal-Mart’s relocation
policy might be bad for tied stayers—that it “really put good, smart
women at a disadvantage in our company because at that time they
weren’t as free to pick up and move as many men were”—he paid no
attention to the consequences for tied movers or the movers themselves.55 The legislative history of UI benefits for “compelling family
reasons” makes clear that these benefits were intended to address the
gendered tied-mover problem, as they “would particularly help
women, who are . . . more likely to need to leave work . . . [to] follow[
52. See Schultz, supra note 42, at 1908.
53. See id. at 1889–92, 1909–10 (recounting self-esteem and other nonmonetary benefits of
work); see also Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1,
25–31 (2005).
54. The social security system attempts to compensate for sex inequality in the family that
affects eligibility for social security benefits, which turns on labor market participation. A
spousal benefit is paid to the spouse of a person (the primary beneficiary) who earned credit for
social security benefits through market work when the primary beneficiary retires. But these
benefits only help spouses whose primary service has been in the home. A spouse who has
worked both in the market and in the home cannot join the spousal benefit with credits accrued
on her own behalf through market labor; she will receive the greater of her own benefits or onehalf the amount of her spouse’s. Thus, these benefits do not help those who are out of work for
periods of time after a move or whose employment outcomes are worsened by mobility. See
Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
38–39 (1996)
55. See WALTON, supra note 10, at 171. Sam Walton’s wife has been quoted as saying, “Sam,
we’ve been married two years and we’ve moved sixteen times. Now, I’ll go with you any place
you want so long as you don’t ask me to live in a big city.” Id. at 21.
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] a spouse.”56 This is a step forward in recognizing the importance of
women as workers and the impact of gendered family dynamics on
women in the market. Nonetheless, the provision of UI benefits
merely addresses the unequal effects of gendered mobility dynamics,
and in effect approves the underlying dynamics by subsidizing them.
Unlike the protection offered by antidiscrimination law, the provision of UI benefits and the allocation of assets upon divorce carry no
community judgment about the impact of structural gender inequality
at the intersection of the family and the market for women’s employment opportunities. It is the role of antidiscrimination law to highlight inequality and pass judgment on its associated harms. The fact
that extra-Title VII remedies may further entrench gendered mobility
dynamics by compensating tied movers for their losses is at odds with
the antistereotyping strain of Title VII sex discrimination jurisprudence, which aims to make women’s roles maximally revisable.57
Therefore, in addition to being inadequate, these extra-Title VII remedies may actually cause harm.
III. THE DANGERS

OF

TITLE VII: TOO MUCH FAMILY

One potential remedy for the limits of Title VII’s consideration of
the family is a disparate impact suit premised on gendered family dynamics that, in interaction with a particular employer policy, create a
disparate impact on women. A successful disparate impact suit could
seek the elimination of the offending policy as injunctive relief. So
although Title VII provides no remedy for the harms to partners
caused by discriminatory policies at the intersection of work and family, it could be used to eliminate the policy, which would incidentally
prevent future harms to partners. In Dukes, for example, if the suit
eliminated the relocation policy, it would provide no relief to tied
movers who had already relocated, but would likely result in fewer
tied movers. And elimination of the relocation policy of course would
make it easier for tied stayers to be promoted at Wal-Mart.
Despite the potential for Title VII to challenge such a policy under
the disparate impact theory, a disparate impact suit based on women’s
family roles runs the risk of relying too much on the family by presupposing the very gendered family mobility dynamics that the disparate
treatment claim aims to make irrelevant. In Dukes, for example, the
plaintiffs alleged that the relocation policy had a disparate impact because women were in fact less likely than men to move due to differ56. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-414, at 72 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69, 71.
57. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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ential attitudes and responsibilities toward work and family. In
presupposing these dynamics, however, the disparate impact suit relies on the family–market divide, putting women firmly on the family
side and reinforcing the very stereotypes about women’s commitment
to market work that Title VII was meant to prevent. So while the
critics of the family–market divide have criticized legal interventions
like Title VII for only helping those women who are most like men,58
a disparate impact challenge to a relocation policy like Wal-Mart’s
may suffer the opposite problem: only when women are shown to be
least like men can their claims succeed.
A. Strands of Disparate Impact: First Generation Claims
To raise a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must allege a specific
facially neutral policy with a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class. In Dukes, the plaintiffs would have to establish, through
statistical proof, that women were less likely to be promoted because
of the relocation policy. There are two readings of such proof, which
correspond to two theories of disparate impact litigation. First, disparate impact is meant to “smoke out” intentional discrimination.
Under this view, the adverse impact of the policy reflects discrimination, either conscious or not, against women, and nothing about
women’s willingness to relocate.59 Second, disparate impact is meant
to hold employers responsible for policies that disproportionately exclude members of a protected class from advancing in the workplace
based on characteristics of that protected class when the employer
could use a less discriminatory option.60
The first theory does not say anything about the characteristics of
the protected class. The discrimination occurs because the employer
acts based on the employees’ membership in the protected class. In
the context of Dukes, this could mean that Wal-Mart failed to consider
women for promotion because the relevant decision makers believed
they would not be willing to move, or that Wal-Mart held women to a
more stringent standard under the policy because they needed to
58. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 1552 (“Antidiscrimination law does not end the actual subordination of women in the market but instead mainly benefits a small percentage of women who
adopt ‘male’ roles.”).
59. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 498–99,
520–21, 532 (2003) (setting forth the “evidentiary dragnet for deliberate discrimination” theory
of disparate impact as compared with other non-intent-based theories, but categorizing disparate
impact as a remedy for unconscious discrimination in the latter theories).
60. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595; Primus, supra note 59, at 498–99, 521–24.
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demonstrate their commitment to the job. Disparate impact is a way
to get at this intentional discrimination without proving intent.
The second theory, on the other hand, is based on underlying characteristics common to the class. Under this theory, a policy burdens a
protected class because of a trait the class shares that other workers
do not. The adverse impact is due to the interaction of the policy and
the trait, and not anything conscious or unconscious the employer is
doing (other than putting the policy in place). In the Dukes case, this
would mean that the adverse impact arose from the fact that women
are less willing or able to relocate for a managerial position than men.
Here, I am interested in the second theory, which differentiates it
from disparate treatment as a theoretical and doctrinal matter.61 This
theory of discrimination poses a danger that sex discrimination cases
like Dukes based on a nonbiological family-related trait—for example, that women are less likely to relocate for work—will reinforce
stereotypes about women and the family–market divide by proving
the truth of these stereotypes. Given that plaintiffs do not need to
specify which theory of disparate impact forms the basis of their suit
(indeed they may not know), the danger may arise whenever the suit
implies this second theory. Before further exploring this argument
about the dangers of disparate impact litigation for this class of cases
based on non-biological traits (“second generation” disparate impact
claims), it will be helpful to distinguish this class of cases from other
disparate impact sex discrimination cases (“first generation” disparate
impact claims).
First generation disparate impact claims are based on sex-differentiated physical attributes. Dothard v. Rawlinson, in which the Supreme
Court struck down height and weight requirements for state prison
guards, is the seminal case.62 Policies like those at issue in Dothard
disproportionately exclude women because they are less able to conform to the policy due to anatomical differences between men and
women.63 While these disparate impact claims based on physical traits
are premised on sex-based generalizations (i.e., all women are not
shorter than all men), they run little risk of entrenching stereotypes
because these physical traits are immutable and thus not subject to the
prescriptive force of a stereotype: that is, the fact of the generalization
61. See Primus, supra note 59, at 521–24.
62. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323, 332 (1977).
63. See id.; Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 388–89 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that an employer’s provision of unsanitary bathroom facilities had a disparate impact on women due to sexdifferentiated anatomical features that led to higher rates of infection for women resulting from
the use of such bathrooms).

776

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:759

does not make the generalization more likely to happen.64 There is
nothing that women can do to make themselves taller on average as a
class. Therefore, beliefs about women’s height will have no impact on
women’s ability to advance in the workplace, as they will not make
women more likely to be or remain short.65
B. Stereotyping Risks of Second Generation Claims
Second generation disparate impact claims are based not on physical traits, but on characteristics with origins in gendered family dynamics that have a disproportionate impact on women in the
workplace. For instance, in Dukes, the adverse impact is due to the
fact that women are less likely than men to move for a promotion.66
The second generation claim is founded on statistical evidence of the
way family life affects the market: it presupposes—and indeed is premised on—a fact from family life about men and women. What distinguishes these family-based facts from the physical facts of the first
generation claims is their capacity for prescriptive force. Even if the
family-based fact is descriptively accurate (e.g., women are less likely
to move for a promotion than men), unlike a physical trait, it runs the
risk of entrenching preexisting stereotypes founded on the fact—indeed, the very stereotypes that are challenged by the disparate treat64. See Meredith Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 151–52, 162 (2010)
(arguing that the harm of sex stereotypes is not their overbreadth but their prescriptive force in
terms of entrenching gender roles consistent with the stereotype).
65. Disparate impact challenges to job requirements based on physical skills (such as strength
and speed), as compared with physical traits, are harder to classify. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dial
Corp., 469 F.3d 735, 742 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a finding that a pre-employment strength test
had an unlawful disparate impact on female applicants); Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308
F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding the district court’s determination that a running test for
transit officers with a disparate impact on women was justified by business necessity). These
differences result from sex-based anatomical differences that are mutable in a limited way.
Women can, with training, become stronger and faster. So despite their basis in physical reality,
disparate impact challenges on the basis of physical skills run the risk of naturalizing sex differences that are subject to change. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that even the concept of biological sex is constructed). Nonetheless, if men and women both
train equal amounts, men on average will have more upper body strength and be faster than
women. So stereotypes based on these physical skills may be less dangerous than stereotypes
based fully in social construction because their biological reality already limits their revisability.
These cases highlight how disparate impact sex discrimination claims may be best placed along a
spectrum of prescriptive force, rather than the binary I propose. Nonetheless, I will retain the
dichotomy here for disquisitional ease.
66. Although one can imagine many gendered aspects of the family that would have a disparate impact on women in the workplace—for example, the disproportionate number of hours
women spend on care work in the home—not all will meet the requirement that a disparate
impact suit challenge a “specific employment practice.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
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ment claim raised in Dukes. It is this prescriptive force—that the fact
of generalization makes the generalization more likely to happen—
that amounts to the key danger of sex stereotypes.67 Precisely because these family traits, unlike physical traits, are subject to change,
entrenching stereotypes about them can concretize them and enhance
their prescriptive force as “gender rules” about how men and women
should behave.68
1. The Prescriptive Force of Second Generation Claims
Second generation claims can give credence to stereotypes about
traits that make women worse workers than men because evidence is
brought in court that makes these differences real and verifiable. To
prove the claim, the plaintiffs must put forward evidence suggesting
that women are less able than men to conform to the employer’s policy. This suggests permanence and immutability to this fact, and in
this way solidifies it.69 This type of proof of women’s distinctness related to work set forth in litigation makes these differences salient to
judges, employers, and the public for a case with even a fraction of the
media coverage of Dukes. Once the evidence winds up in a legal document, and especially a legal opinion, it is hard to overcome these
facts or show that they have changed. Concretizing a social fact about
women’s distinctiveness is at odds with the purpose of sex discrimination law with respect to stereotypes: to keep them maximally revisable, and especially not to reinforce them.70
Plaintiffs in these suits may posit a family-based reason for the disparate impact evidence they put forward, providing a narrative that
activates a stereotype consistent with existing cultural narratives. In
Dukes, for example, one of the plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. William Bielby,
writes in his report: “While it may indeed be the case that, on average,
more women than men face family constraints that limit their ability to
relocate for a management position, stereotypes lead people to act on
an [sic] assumptions that overstate the extent to which that is true.”71
In the italicized portion of this statement, Dr. Bielby himself may be
acting on a stereotype, as he makes this statement about women’s relationship to work and family without citing any evidence, and for no
67. See Render, supra note 64, at 151–52, 162.
68. See id.
69. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2000) (noting
the harm associated with “generalizations” that “embody . . . ‘fixed notions concerning the roles
and abilities of males and females’ ”).
70. See Render, supra note 64, at 162.
71. Bielby Decl., supra note 5, at 27 (emphasis added).
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reason. Sex stereotyping is a wrong under Title VII regardless of
whether the employer acts on stereotypes about women that are simply overbroad or entirely unjustified. Moreover, putting forward a
reason for the disparate impact and locating it in women’s commitment to the family provides a rationale consistent with a ubiquitous
preexisting stereotype, allowing that stereotype to gain greater
resonance.
Judges too may play a role in entrenching stereotypes. In the Seventh Circuit relocation case referenced above, Judge Posner wrote:
“Realism requires acknowledgment that the average mother is more
sensitive than the average father to the possibly disruptive effect on
children of moving to another city . . . .”72 Perhaps surprisingly, this
statement came in the context of a disparate treatment claim, and thus
there was no reason for referencing the “reality” of how likely men
and women are to relocate. Even beyond positing this reality without
evidentiary basis, the court goes further, again with no evidence, in
giving the reason behind this assumed “reality”: that mothers are
more likely to prioritize family over work than fathers (and, on the
flip side, that fathers are more likely to prioritize work over family).
Again, this narrative fits neatly into preexisting stereotypes and helps
to solidify them. That this statement could arise in the context of a
disparate treatment claim aimed precisely against these stereotypes
shows the even greater danger such statements could pose in a disparate impact claim, in which judges are likely to pay less attention to
avoiding stereotypes.
By entrenching stereotypes, second generation lawsuits may also
enhance their prescriptive force on employers’ and employees’ behavior. To the extent the second generation lawsuit makes its factual
predicate—e.g., that women are less likely to move for work than
men—more concrete, permanent, and salient, the factual predicate
becomes more of a fact in the world about how men qua men and
women qua women behave. This factual predicate can begin to
harden into a “gender rule” that is followed simply because it is perceived as the appropriate gender-conforming behavior.73 In other
words, the more men and women believe that women, as a rule, do
not move for work (and conversely that men, as a rule, do move for
72. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
73. Render explains the prescriptive force of gender rules as two-fold: a gender rule acts as a
regulatory rule in that it comes to provide an independent reason for action (i.e., that women
and men follow its constraints simply because of the existence of the rule), and a gender rule acts
as a constitutive rule in that it polices the boundaries of gender conformity (i.e., it tells us the
appropriate behavior for a man and for a woman). See Render, supra note 64, at 172–78.
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work), the more this fact in itself tells men and women how they
should behave. The more these kinds of facts are broadcast through
disparate impact litigation, the more that these beliefs about men’s
and women’s behavior are entrenched, increasing the likelihood that
both employers and employees will abide by these gender rules,
whether consciously or not.
While the risk of entrenching stereotypes with disparate impact
claims is not unique to sex discrimination claims, sex-based disparate
impact claims present a far greater concern for prescriptive force than
race-based disparate impact claims. This is because, as compared with
race-based cases, sex segregation in the workplace is more likely to be
viewed as a result of employees’ own choices rather than employer
discrimination. This can be seen through the different views courts
have taken of the lack of interest defense in sex- and race-based
claims. The lack of interest defense essentially says that the underrepresentation of the protected class in a given position is due to
members of the underrepresented class’s own choice not to seek access to the position rather than discrimination by the employer.74 As
Vicki Schultz has explained, courts have held different assumptions
about the role of choice and discrimination in shaping minorities’ and
women’s work aspirations.75 In race discrimination cases, courts have
recognized the history of race discrimination in the labor market and
acknowledged that minorities’ current employment choices have been
shaped by that discrimination.76 Judges thus applied the futility doctrine, which held that if minorities failed to apply for segregated jobs,
this did not signal lack of interest in the work, but rather a sense of
futility created by the employer’s history of discrimination.77
In interpreting sex-based segregation in the workplace, by contrast,
courts, and especially conservative judges, have been more likely to
see women’s current work aspirations as a product of women’s own
choices rather than as a product of past discrimination. For women,
differential outcomes in the market have been consistently rationalized as based on unrevisable biological differences, equally firmly
rooted pre-labor-market gender socialization, or some combination of
74. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 313–14, 322 (7th Cir. 1988).
75. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1749, 1771–81 (1990).
76. Id. at 1771–75.
77. Id. at 1772; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (recognizing in the affirmative action context that the exclusion of minorities from certain jobs was due
to vestiges of discrimination rather than choice).
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the two.78 Regardless of whether the source is nature or nurture,
courts have accepted that women do not want jobs with stereotypically masculine features, and that women do not want to prioritize
work over family.79 Therefore, setting forth evidence of a sex-based
disparate impact in a second generation claim further reinforces the
already held view that men and women simply have different work
preferences, as compared with race-based disparate impacts, which
are more likely to be attributed to past discrimination.
2. Tension Between Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment
The risk of the prescriptive force of second generation claims leads
to a tension between the disparate impact and disparate treatment
causes of action.80 For example, in Dukes, the plaintiffs might be
claiming both that (1) women are less likely to move for a promotion
than men and thus that Wal-Mart must eliminate its relocation policy
if it is not a job-related business necessity or there is a less discriminatory alternative, and that (2) employers may not assume any individual woman will refuse a promotion because she is less likely to move.
To be sure, this is not strictly a contradiction, as employers are not
entitled to stereotype any individual employee on the basis of even
accurate stereotypes about her protected class unless the stereotype is
perfectly accurate.81 Nonetheless, there is some tension in putting
forth evidence of exactly the facts on which employers are not entitled
to act. And in any event, putting forward the facts may undermine
one of the goals of Title VII: to limit employers acting on the basis of
stereotypes.
78. See Schultz, supra note 75, at 1800.
79. For example, in Sears, the lack of interest defense for sales commission jobs was granted
based in part on the notion that women do not want jobs requiring these types of masculine
traits and because commission sales jobs required working longer and more irregular hours that
were presumably incompatible with women’s family obligations. See Sears, 839 F.2d at 313. In
the affirmative action context, limited opportunities for women in traditionally male jobs has
been recognized as a source of women’s underrepresentation. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 635 (1987).
80. In a case addressing whether an employer could use race-conscious measures to avoid
disparate treatment liability without running afoul of the prohibition on disparate treatment,
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion taking up the question of whether the disparate impact
cause of action was in tension with the formal equality ideal behind disparate treatment, as well
as constitutional equality protections. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009)
(Scalia, J., concurring). The concerns raised in the sex discrimination context are different.
They sound in the prescriptive harms of stereotyping, which is especially problematic in the
context of sex discrimination, rather than in the harms that flow from the mere act of classifying
by race that motivate proponents of a colorblindness view of antidiscrimination law.
81. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707–11 (1978) (holding
that the fact that women lived longer than men could not form the basis for employer decision
making because not all women lived longer than all men).
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Of course, Title VII bars employers from judging any individual
woman by the characteristics of her group. So even if women were
less willing to relocate, Wal-Mart could not lawfully deny any particular woman a promotion on that basis.82 But the law does not come
close to enforcing this perfectly. Many of the employment opportunities that women would be denied due to stereotyping would be at the
hiring stage, which is notoriously difficult to detect.83 And many of
the stereotypes would operate on an unconscious level,84 which employment discrimination law generally does not recognize.85 Even
when plaintiffs bring claims for hiring, pay, or promotion discrimination, they have the cards stacked against them.86 They are the least
successful plaintiffs in federal court aside from pro se prisoners.87
It is obvious to see the stereotyping dangers for a losing disparate
impact claim, as it would bring to the forefront bases for stereotypes
about women in the workplace without the countervailing benefit of
eliminating the policy that led to the inequality in the first place. Disparate impact plaintiffs are even less successful than disparate treatment plaintiffs.88 But even for the rare successful second generation
claim that eliminates the policy it challenges, the key question is
whether more harm is caused by portraying women as an ill fit for
current workplace norms or by having women disproportionately suffer for failing to meet norms that are not justified by business necessity. A full examination of this question is outside the narrower scope
of this Article. The aim here is to highlight the potential for en82. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
83. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time that You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 99, 125–26 (2007).
84. See sources cited supra note 8; Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle
Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,474, 16,477 (2012).
85. See Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 85, 100
(2011). Nonetheless, some scholars have pointed to limited circumstances in which Title VII
recognizes disparate treatment without discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Managing
the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory
Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1364 (2009) (describing harassment by third-parties as one
such circumstance).
86. See generally Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 110 (2012), http://
yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/16/gertner.html (arguing that structural features of discrimination decision making have led to plaintiff-unfriendly dynamics); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (arguing that misperceptions
of the ease of winning discrimination cases and judicial biases lead to the trouble plaintiffs face
in these cases).
87. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of AntiDiscrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276, 1282–85 (2012).
88. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
734 (2006).
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trenching stereotypes as a cost to raising a second generation disparate impact claim that should be weighed against its expected benefits.
In raising this concern, I will briefly sketch out a few factors that
might count in assessing second generation suits and the risk of stereotyping, starting with the theoretical, and turning to the practical.89
One consideration is whether it is best for women to conform to the
norms of the workplace or for the norms of the workplace to conform
to women. It may simply be the case that it will be difficult for women
to conform to the norms of the workplace given current gendered features of the family without a significant change in public policies that
support the family. This is all the more true given that it would also
require significant changes in men being more involved in the family
to better support the role of women in the market.90 On the flip side,
changing norms of the workplace may benefit men as well as women,
as men are not only benefited but are also burdened by the demands
of ideal worker stereotypes.91 By lessening worker demands and creating more space for caregivers to serve as ideal workers, changing
workplace norms could allow both men and women more flexibility in
their choice of market and family roles. And, as some feminists have
emphasized, the market is premised on masculine values—e.g., individualism, competition, and arm’s-length bargaining—that warrant
challenge and would benefit from the injection of feminine values—
e.g., interdependence, cooperation, and connection—that would come
with conforming to women’s needs.92
There is also a countervailing risk of stereotyping that results from
not challenging a policy that disproportionately excludes women from
certain roles in the workplace. Sex segregation and other gendered
aspects of work can powerfully influence women’s (and men’s) work
choices and aspirations. The workplace is an important site of gender
socialization that constructs men’s and women’s work preferences according to the appropriate gender roles of the workplace.93 There89. I will explore this question in a future piece that more fully addresses the dangers of
disparate impact lawsuits in the context of sex discrimination.
90. Women still do more housework and childcare than men. See Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and the Law of Marriage, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 205, 207 (2012) (citing studies).
91. Cf. Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839 (2008) (explaining how, in the context of the ADA, accommodations can benefit those beyond their intended
beneficiaries).
92. See Olsen, supra note 1, at 1499–1501.
93. See Schultz, supra note 75, at 1824–39 (explaining sex segregation as a response to
gendered features of the workplace); Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A
Rational Preference with Disturbing Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 4–5 (2004) (explaining sex segregation as

2013] THE FAMILY AND THE MARKET AT WAL-MART

783

fore, leaving in place policies that create distinct work roles for men
and women can perpetuate sex segregation and sex stereotypes.
These potential benefits of second generation disparate impact litigation must be weighed against the reality of the limited ability of
disparate impact claims to bring about the types of changes just discussed. Disparate impact claims are ill-suited to move the market
away from masculine norms given that many employer policies and
structures will not be subject to a successful disparate impact challenge, either because they do not amount to a specific employer practice,94 because a statistical disparate impact cannot be established,95 or
because they are justified by business necessity.96 In particular, the
specific employer practice requirement hamstrings Title VII from providing a capacious enough mechanism to support broad-based attacks
on workplace arrangements founded in market values, and indeed it
has blocked efforts at such changes.97 So even if a narrower challenge
like the one to Wal-Mart’s relocation policy succeeds, if most market
norms will remain in place, this increases the harm of portraying
women in a way that makes them an ill fit as workers under these
norms.
This risk is especially acute because the stereotypes that are enforced may not be limited simply to the social fact that forms the basis
of the claim; they may go far broader in undermining women as equal
employees. In the context of the Dukes case, for example, proving
that women are less likely than men to relocate at Wal-Mart might
also signal that women are less committed workers. By relying on
statistical proof meant to show that the protected class is less able to
meet the employer’s demands, the second generation claim threatens
to reinforce stereotypes, not only of this particular trait’s role in limiting women’s ability to conform to the norms of the workplace, but of
women’s ability to conform to the norms of the workplace in general.
In this way, second generation disparate impact claims might only further reinforce negative stereotypes of women’s commitment to the
workplace and induce more statistical discrimination against women.
women’s response to avoiding an all-male workplace that would pose a high risk of discrimination and harassment).
94. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
97. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405–06 (9th
Cir. 1985) (rejecting comparable worth claim under disparate impact theory because the plaintiffs challenged not a specific workplace practice, but the entire market-based system of determining wages).
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Wal-Mart’s relocation policy, like many employer policies that expect a fully and freely available worker, presents a barrier to women’s
employment opportunities because of the way the policy intersects
with gendered family features. Remedies may thus aim to adjust either the application of the policy or the gendered family dynamics.
Title VII aims to adjust the application of the policy, but, as explained
above, does so in a way that either ignores relevant effects on the
family, or relies on the family so much as to risk entrenching dangerous stereotypes. Alternative approaches to removing the barrier
would focus on ways to remedy the underlying family features or to
remedy the application of the policy in ways that are less harmful than
Title VII’s current approach.
As for addressing the underlying gendered family features, to the
extent that the distribution of care within the family could be redistributed such that men are taking on more family responsibilities, this
would lessen the disparate impact of employer policies on women.
This redistribution of family care would simultaneously reduce both
the need for Title VII to recognize the family and the risk associated
with doing so. It would also likely lead men to pay more attention to
the way that employer policies affect those with family responsibilities
and perhaps better incorporate this impact into household decision
making. Moreover, as employer policies have a greater impact on
male employees, this broader impact may help with the problem of
underrecognition of the family, if not by Title VII, then at least by the
employers who put the relevant policies in place. A full discussion of
the ways in which the law might remedy the underlying gendered family features that intersect with employer policies to create barriers for
women’s employment opportunities is outside the scope of this Article. Aside from an existing literature that focuses on this approach,98
these solutions do not directly address the problem of Title VII’s
under- and overrecognition of the family.
An alternative, then, would be to consider how Title VII might be
used to recognize the impact of employer policies on the family without the stereotyping currently risked by a second generation disparate
impact claim. I suggest an alternative “third generation” disparate impact claim, as well as a few more modest ways that plaintiffs and
judges might reduce the risk of stereotyping when raising or deciding
second generation claims. These modifications demonstrate the po98. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 53, at 79–82 (discussing various paid family leave arrangements aimed at redistributing caregiving labor within the family).
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tential for a Title VII claim that can challenge inequality at the intersection of the family and the market that pays neither too little nor
too much attention to the family.
A. The Third Generation Disparate Impact Claim
The third generation disparate impact suit would provide an alternative mechanism to challenge employer policies that have a disparate
impact on women without risking Title VII’s overreliance on the family. The third generation claim, rather than focusing on the disparate
impact of employer policies on women, would instead focus on identifying employer policies that create or entrench primary worker and
primary caregiver/secondary worker roles in the family, and use this as
a proxy for sex-based disparate impact.
Taking the relocation policy as an example, the policy has a disparate impact on women because relocation is incompatible with both
partners in the family being primary workers. By premising an employee’s advancement on uprooting the employee in a way that interrupts a partner’s employment, the policy envisions a primary worker
with a portable family. To the extent the portable family includes a
partner, that partner is either a primary caregiver or a secondary
worker. The policy has a disparate impact on women because men are
disproportionately likely to be the primary worker, and women are
disproportionately likely to be the primary caregiver or secondary
worker. For third generation claims, instead of proving a disparate
impact on women, the plaintiffs would prove that the policy assumes
these primary worker and primary caregiver/secondary worker
dynamics.
Although the legal wrong (in terms of the violation of Title VII)
would still be based in the underlying disparate impact on women, the
claim would not be proven with statistics that women fare worse
under the policy. Rather, the plaintiffs would put forth evidence that
the policy leads an employee subject to it to take on the primary
worker role in such a way that generally makes it harder for the employee’s partner to advance in employment. This could be shown with
data about a negative employment effect on the partners of employees who were subject to the policy.
This shift in focus to the sex-neutral impact on the employee, which
in turn impacts the family, would mean that such claims would not risk
entrenching stereotypes about women’s family and work priorities.
First, because such claims would not be tied to sex, they present much
less risk of activating and reinforcing sex-based stereotypes of work
and family roles. The third generation claim would take the focus off
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of women’s incompatibility with workplace policies and reframe the
problem as incompatibility between the workplace policy and family
more generally. This framing also brings attention to the way that
these types of policies affect primary workers—disproportionately
men—who are less able to live balanced lives and become involved in
the family due to such policies. In this way, such claims would focus
less on women’s excessive family roles and more not only on women’s
insufficient work roles but also on men’s excessive work roles. A focus on balance between work and family for both sexes could bring its
own benefits.99
Some households may prefer to divide their labor along the traditional primary worker and primary caregiver/secondary worker arrangements. To the extent that the third generation disparate impact
claim makes such arrangements less available in the market (that is,
that at least some employer policies implicated by the third generation
claim would not be supported by business necessity), these households
would bear the burden of fewer employment options that match their
preferences. However, this burden likely would not be so great.
Given the availability of the business necessity defense, many of these
jobs would likely still be available.100 The cause of gender equality
may justify the modest burden that results.
Of course, Title VII does not protect against a disparate impact on
those who desire balanced work and family lives; it only recognizes a
disparate impact on the basis of one of the statute’s protected classes.
To the extent that the third generation claim relies on the primary
worker dynamics identified above as a proxy for a disparate impact on
women, it would be based in currently recognized grounds for Title
VII liability. Given current gendered family dynamics,101 the use of
such a proxy is warranted. Of course, without proving that any specific employer policy indeed does have a statistical disparate impact
on women, the elements of the disparate impact claim would not be
met. So while the third generation claim does not stray far from the
current parameters of Title VII, its acceptance would nonetheless require judicial recognition of this alternate means of showing a disparate impact sex discrimination claim.

99. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834 (2002) (“[B]oth
individuals and society would benefit from a fuller integration of employment, family, and civic
commitments than is now possible in most workplaces . . . .”).
100. See Selmi, supra note 88, at 742–44 (describing courts’ increased acceptance of the business necessity defense).
101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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B. Minimizing the Family in Second Generation Cases
In light of the fact that this alternative disparate impact suit might
not be a feasible solution under current Title VII jurisprudence, there
are a few more modest steps that could be taken with the existing
disparate impact suit that might go some way towards reducing its
stereotyping risks, even if they do not directly address the tension between disparate impact and disparate treatment. First, plaintiffs could
emphasize that their disparate impact claims fall within the first theory of “smoking out” disparate impact discussed above.102 So, for example, in Dukes, the plaintiffs could argue that the adverse impact of
the challenged policy at least in part reflects discrimination, either
conscious or not, against women, rather than women’s unwillingness
to relocate. The disparate impact theory is relied upon because the
proof of intent is too hard to come by. Explaining that the adverse
impact is (at least in part) a result of discrimination by the employer,
rather than any characteristics of the women, could curtail stereotyping. In fact, statistics of a disparate impact alone reveal nothing about
whether the impact is due to actions by the employer or choices of the
employee (or some interaction of the two).103 In many cases, without
further evidence, the employer discrimination theory will be at least as
plausible as the employee choice theory, and plaintiffs have no reason
not to offer the former explanation.
In a case like Dukes, in which the plaintiffs challenge the application of the policy on both disparate treatment and disparate impact
grounds, such an argument is especially plausible. In these cases, disparate impact can be viewed as simply an alternative means of proving
disparate treatment. This suggests that to avoid stereotyping, plaintiffs raising disparate impact claims should accompany them with disparate treatment claims on the same ground to further support the
“smoking out” theory of disparate impact.
As noted above, the Dukes plaintiffs did not follow this strategy.
They instead presumed that the disparate impact was due to women’s
relative family and work priorities.104 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Dukes provides an example of the better approach. She states that
“[a]bsent instruction otherwise, there is a risk that managers will act
on the familiar assumption that women, because of their services to
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
103. See Schultz, supra note 75, at 1824–39 (explaining how employees’ work “choices” are
constructed in the face of gendered (and discriminatory) work structures).
104. See Bielby Decl., supra note 5, at 27 (“While it may indeed be the case that, on average,
more women than men face family constraints that limit their ability to relocate for a management position . . . .”).

788

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:759

husband and children, are less mobile than men.”105 This makes clear
that employers may be acting on an unfounded assumption that reflects nothing about the reality of women’s willingness to move.
Second, plaintiffs can make reference to women (and men) who do
not conform to the patterns underlying their charge to make clear that
the statistics they are presenting are not universal. These counterexamples can go some way to undermining stereotypes of the roles
women as a group and men as a group take on at work and in the
family. A judge may also then reference these counter-stereotypical
examples in a decision. The challenge with this approach is to incentivize plaintiffs to adopt this strategy, because such counterexamples
would seem to undermine a disparate impact claim. Of course, one
incentive would be to emphasize the stereotyping risks that are the
focus of this Part, through outreach efforts and perhaps even EEOC
guidance. For plaintiffs’ lawyers who are repeat players in this area,
and particularly advocacy organizations whose institutional interests
are to support broader sex equality concerns—both of whom represented plaintiffs in the Dukes case106—this may be sufficient incentive
to protect their long-term interests.107 And these lawyers who are
likely to be responsive to this incentive are also the most likely to be
involved in precisely the type of very public cases, like Dukes, that
most risk entrenching stereotypes. This may be sufficient to curb a
significant amount of risk.
Third, education outreach for plaintiffs’ lawyers could be accompanied by education outreach for judges on how to avoid acting on and
entrenching stereotypes in their decision making and opinion writing.
For several decades now, gender bias task forces have tried to
counteract the ways that ingrained assumptions about men and
women inform judicial decision making and become entrenched in the
law, including in employment discrimination cases.108 Such programs
105. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
106. The plaintiffs in Dukes were represented by multiple nonprofit civil rights and women’s
rights legal advocacy organizations, as well as several plaintiff-side employment discrimination
law firms.
107. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–107 (1974) (discussing different litigation incentives
for repeat players as opposed to “one-shotter” litigants and lawyers).
108. See Morrison Torrey, You Call that Education, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 93 n.1 (2004)
(listing various state and federal judicial task forces on gender bias); The Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
745, 883–89, 974–77 (1994); Dorothy W. Nelson, Introduction to the Effects of Gender in the
Federal Courts: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
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could include a focus on the risks of gender stereotyping in Title VII
decision making.
Finally, plaintiffs’ lawyers could avoid some of the risk of entrenching stereotypes with second generation suits by limiting the
publicity of the evidence they are presenting. This could be achieved
by filing such evidence under seal or by working towards voluntary
conciliation or early settlement. Because publicity and litigation have
benefits in themselves for sex discrimination plaintiffs,109 the costs of
limited publicity would have to be weighed against the benefits. This
analysis would be difficult because the benefits are internal to the
plaintiffs, while the stereotyping costs are externalities that plaintiffs
are unlikely to take adequate account of. These costs are most likely
to be considered by the repeat players discussed above, who are more
likely to bear the costs of these stereotypes in future litigation.110
Again, given that these repeat players are most likely to be involved in
higher profile cases that most risk stereotyping, consideration of the
costs by these lawyers may go some way towards containing
stereotypes.111
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII’s simultaneous under- and overrecognition of the family
not only presupposes and reinforces the family–market divide, it also
points to a larger tension within the statute itself. The Dukes disparate treatment and disparate impact challenges to Wal-Mart’s relocation policy exposes a statutory rift that arises from Title VII’s
ambivalence about the family. The disparate treatment claim takes
aim at Wal-Mart’s subjective decision-making practices that are particularly susceptible to biases about women’s roles in the family while
ignoring the underlying gendered family dynamics. The disparate impact suit takes account of these family dynamics, but in so doing, entrenches stereotypes about women’s family roles that are the target of
the disparate treatment claim. The tension between the two causes of
action, as highlighted by Dukes, militates in favor of careful consideration of whether and how to pursue a second generation sex discrimi731, 731 (1994) (discussing judicial education workshop on gender bias in Title VII decision
making given in the Ninth Circuit).
109. See generally Lesley M. Wexler, Extralegal Whitewashes, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (2013)
(discussing how publicity can lead to pressure for voluntary corporate changes); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences with the 9/11 Victim
Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008) (noting the importance of litigation for
normative judgment, public accountability, and policy change).
110. See Galanter, supra note 107, at 97–107.
111. See id.
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nation disparate impact claim as a means to furthering gender
equality. This tension suggests a need for further theoretical work to
reconcile the role of Title VII and its two causes of action as a means
of furthering women’s employment opportunities. This Article is
meant as a first step towards that goal.

